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just conception of naturalism is therefore far more generous than the one idealists seem to entertain. Naturalism completed and thought out does not turn into animistic idealism, but it does develop into an empirical idealism in which the word idealism recovers its popular meaning and signifies a whole-souled response to humanity's needs and opportunities.

Such an empirical idealism is, it seems to the reviewer, what philosophy is on the way to becoming, and this should give us the orientation that many students of it must long have wished for. Old ideas, as expressive of an honest moral faith, and held as precious by so many men and women of fine culture, are not to be treated as merely speculative error; but they must be re-identified as genuinely imaginative. The field of expression we need to recognize is the one called poetry, and to identify idealism as poetry is by no means to reject its essential faith and its analysis of what is called in the lecture "the intimate aspect of experience." Idealism's faith in art and poetry as a serious and important expression of the human spirit is referred to in the lecture, and this faith is natural to those who are at home in a similar atmosphere and who are interested, ultimately, not in facts but in values, if the antithesis may be allowed. If idealism is esteemed for its implications, so is poetry valued for the sensitive wisdom which men and women that know those "intimate aspects of experience" have so often used it to reveal. The identity is an identity of function. Supernaturalism can not be any longer justified as knowledge, but it may be justified as poetry if used with enlightened sincerity. For as the lecturer justly says (p.19), "idealism can not afford to be obscurantist."

This transition from supernaturalism to "ethically idealistic" naturalism, from animistic "idealism" to empirical idealism, is I believe, going on in philosophy at the present time.

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ROUSSEAU AND CONSCIENCE

MY volume *Rousseau and Romanticism* evidently strikes Professor Schinz as a violent diatribe rather than as a sober critique. Curiously enough his review¹ affects me in very much the same way. He seems to me to make an almost bewildering variety of misleading statements either about my point of view or that of Rousseau—varied by an occasional misstatement. As an example of the latter one may take his assertion that I abuse Rousseau and the Rousseauists "because they express regret at not

¹ See this JOURNAL, Vol. XVII., No. 1, January 1, 1920.

having conquered their passions." The true charge that I bring against them is that they take as a badge of spiritual superiority the sheer intensity of their emotional and imaginative unrestraint.

As an example of a misleading statement one may take the passage about Rousseau and *Kultur*. If one had no other source of information than Professor Schinz's review one might gather that I ascribe to Rousseau this influence upon the Germans purely from personal bias and eccentricity. This influence is, on the contrary, one of the best established facts of literary history. The Germans themselves, to do them justice, so far from denying this influence, are even inclined to overstate it. For example, Professor Paul Hensel says in his *Rousseau* (1907), that (compared with his influence in Germany) "Rousseau's influence in France seems almost trifling." In Germany "Rousseau became the basis not of a guillotine but of a new culture [*Kultur*]."

Professor Schinz does not make sufficiently clear that I have not attempted in my volume rounded estimates of individuals, not even of Rousseau; and that I have not attacked romanticism in general, but only one of three main types of romanticism that I am careful to distinguish—a type that is practically identical with emotional naturalism or sentimentalism; and finally that I am attacking primarily even this type only in its ethical pretensions. Here the crucial point is the treatment of conscience by the emotional naturalists. The corruption of conscience, as I say, underlies all other modern corruptions; so that everything finally converges upon this point. One may judge from the trustworthiness of Professor Schinz's report on this matter as to the general soundness of his review. Commenting on my statement that "Rousseau transforms conscience itself from an inner check to an expansive emotion," he says that this "*of course* is not true *at all*" (my italics). For any one who has read the eighteenth century sentimentalists (and Rousseau is by general consent the arch-sentimentalist) the "*of course*" and the "*at all*" are simply staggering. All students of the period were, I had supposed, agreed that Rousseau and the sentimentalists conceived that they had only to "let their feelings run in soft luxurious flow" and the result would be "virtue." Rousseau, says that perspicacious moralist Joubert, changed virtue from a bridle into a spur. Virtue becomes a passion, differing from other passions, not in kind, but only in degree.² Evidence on this point, were it worth while, could be piled up mountains high. The tendency of course did not originate with Rousseau. In his

² Cf. *Nouvelle Héloïse*, 4^e partie, lettre XII., passage beginning: "*L'on ne triomphe des passions qu'en les opposant l'une à l'autre. Quand celle de la vertu vient à s'élever,*" etc.

work *Is Conscience an Emotion?* (1914), Hastings Rashdall has pointed out the influence here of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and the English deists.

Some traces of the older dualistic morality are indeed to be found in Rousseau;³ but this is a minor trend in Rousseau himself and is practically negligible in his influence, with which alone I am concerned in my volume. Is Professor Schinz naïve enough to suppose that because Rousseau uses the word "virtue" forty-three times in his first *Discourse* what he opposes to the luxurious degeneracy of his contemporaries is a genuine Roman virtue or a true Calvinistic conscience? "Rousseau," says Joubert again, "took wisdom from men's souls by talking to them about virtue." Rousseau's conception of virtue is neither Roman nor Calvinistic but primitivistic—a return to "nature" and the simple life. When we turn to the second *Discourse* to find out what is meant by "nature" we discover that Rousseau's nature is nothing real but only an Arcadian dream. We come here to the true sources of Rousseau's power. He is highly imaginative but along idyllic lines. He throws the glamour of this type of imagination over expansive impulse. Get rid of traditional restraints, he says in substance, (they are only artificial and conventional), and what will result will be a golden age of pure "liberty." English readers are familiar with this conception of "liberty" in Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound* and also in the mouthings of our latest anarchists.

Moral excellence for Rousseau is not the result of a difficult struggle but, if one is only a "beautiful soul," that is, if one has remained a child of nature in the midst of social perversions, one has, in order to be at the same time good and beautiful, merely to follow one's spontaneous temperamental leaning. Thus Julie "n'eut jamais d'autre règle que son cœur, et n'en saurait avoir de plus sûre; elle s'y livre sans scrupule, et, pour bien faire, elle fait tout ce qu'il demande."⁴ Professor Schinz indulges in a reckless abuse of language when he associates with Calvinism and Puritanism the idyllic pictures in the latter part of the *Nouvelle Héloïse*, presided over by this "beautiful soul" whose very death-bed is esthetic and without a single qualm as to her future state. It is

³ The most dualistic passage I can discover in Rousseau is found in the *Profession de foi du Vicaire Savoyard*: "Non, l'homme n'est point un: je veux et je ne veux pas, je me sens à la fois esclave et libre; je vois le bien, je l'aime et je fais le mal," etc.

⁴ *Nouvelle Héloïse*, 5^e partie, lettre II. Cf. also *ibid.*: "Julie était faite pour connaître et goûter tous les plaisirs, et longtemps elle n'aima si chèrement la vertu même que comme la plus douce des voluptés." Of Julie's "affinity," Saint-Preux, Rousseau writes approvingly that, contrary to the accepted view, "il fait de la conscience morale un sentiment, et non pas un jugement."

a "common thing," says Jonathan Edwards describing the true effect of Calvinism, "that persons have had such a sense of their own sinfulness that they have thought themselves to be the worst of all, and that none ever was so vile as they." Rousseau on the contrary looked on himself as the best of men, and tends to inspire a similar spiritual complacency in others.

One point of the utmost importance must be kept in mind if one is to understand the influence of Rousseau. It is implied in his own saying that "his heart and head do not seem to belong to the same individual," and this sentence is to be read in the light of what he says very truly elsewhere, that "cold reason has never done anything illustrious." The side of Rousseau that proceeds from his "head," often very shrewd and even wise, is negligible in the kind of study I have attempted because it has had little effect on other men. It is the imaginative and passionate side of Rousseau, his "heart," which has moved the world. Rousseau's "reason" indeed is not always "cold." We often find in his writings logic in the service of the emotions and moving towards some Utopia conjured up by the Arcadian imagination. Rousseau's "head" would have disapproved of the Revolution which his "heart" (often with his logic as its accomplice) did so much to prepare. I accept M. Lanson's contrast between the two Rousseaus, except that I am not inclined, as he seems to be, to accuse Rousseau of moral cowardice. "The writer," he says, "is a poor dreamy creature who approaches action only with alarm, and with every manner of precaution, and who understands the applications of his boldest doctrines in a way to reassure conservatives and satisfy opportunists. But the work for its part detaches itself from the author, lives its independent life, and, heavily charged with revolutionary explosives which neutralize the moderate and conciliatory elements Rousseau has put into it for his own satisfaction, it exasperates and inspires revolt and fires enthusiasms and irritates hatreds; it is the mother of violence, the source of all that is uncompromising, it launches the simple souls who give themselves up to its strange virtue upon the desperate quest of the absolute, an absolute to be realized now by anarchy and now by social despotism." If I deny the Rousseauistic conception of conscience and morality, it is precisely because it leads in practise to these violent and impossible extremes. Because of this denial Professor Schinz says I am guilty of a fanaticism worse than "Mohammedism," Prussianism, Bolshevism, and the Inquisition all rolled into one! To be able to push one's emotional fervor to such a pitch even in the cool atmosphere of a Journal of Scientific Methods would seem to illustrate the very tendency under

discussion. Professor Schinz is filled with what Jean-Jacques calls "the indignation of virtue."

On the negative side my conclusions are, as a matter of fact, very similar to those of Dr. Rashdall. "The emotionalist theory of ethics," he says, "however little intended to have that result by its supporters is fatal to the deepest spiritual convictions and to the highest spiritual aspirations of the human race." The difficulty begins when one seeks a substitute for emotionalist ethics. It is hard to see that Rashdall, like Kant himself, gets beyond rationalism. As against a rationalistic foundation for ethics the saying of Rousseau holds good that "cold reason has never done anything illustrious." In these final orientations of the human spirit it is necessary to fight fire with fire. The fact is that what is opposed to man's natural will and ordinary impulsive self is not mere "reason" or "judgment" but another type of will, an ethical will, as one may say, that is felt in its relation to the expansive desires as a power of direction and control. The ethical reality or standard or "oneness," with reference to which control is exercised, man can not, I have tried to show, get at directly, but only with the aid of "fiction" or "illusion" or "imagination." Here, in intention at least, is the constructive side of my volume. I seek to develop the contrast between the idyllic or Arcadian imagination of a Rousseau and the ethical, or, as Burke terms it, the moral imagination that one finds in the true sages. This latter type of imaginative "vision" leads to entirely different fruits in action, the only thing that finally matters. The ethical will needs the support of the imagination, if it is to prevail against the natural will. Holding as it does the balance of power between the two conflicting "wills," the imagination may, as I say, be regarded as the universal key to human nature ("Imagination," in Napoleon's phrase, "governs the world"). If one is therefore to treat in a modern, that is, in a positive and critical fashion, the ethical problem, one must deal adequately with the rôle of the imagination. This the founder of the critical philosophy does not seem to me to have done either in the *Critique of Judgment* or elsewhere. There is surely something better to do in the ethical field than to oscillate between rationalism and emotionalism, between the mechanistic nightmare and the romantic dream. The Rousseauist would substitute a facile expansiveness for the Pauline conflict between a law of the spirit and a law of the members and at the same time would enjoy the fruits—for example, peace and brotherhood—that can come only from accepting this conflict and carrying it through. One may sympathize in a way with this particular form of the desire to have one's cake and eat it too, especially when one considers the flattery of human

nature that romantic morality implies with reference to the Calvinistic theology from which it is a recoil; yet it would seem urgent at present to dissipate this sham spirituality, the more dangerous because the less obvious aspect of our present materialism, and to re-establish, if possible, on a thoroughly positive and critical basis the checks and inhibitions of true conscience. Rousseau has so far transcended in his influence the mere man of letters as to challenge comparison with the founders of religions. This comparison I have accordingly made. If it leads me to express a preference for Jesus and Buddha, a preference that seems to inspire in Professor Schinz a certain chagrin, the reason is that these teachers did not seek like Rousseau and the Rousseauists to found the religious virtues on the ruin of the inner life.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Métaphysique et Psychologie. THÉODORE FLOURNOY. Deuxième édition. Paris: Fischbacher. 1919. Pp. xvi + 195.

A second edition of this important work was a long-felt need. When the book appeared for the first time in 1890, it was at once recognized as one of the leading studies in the field of experimental psychology. The author, who was at the same time a physician and a philosopher, had mastered once for all the relations which are bound to exist between experimental psychology and metaphysics. Since then, numerous volumes have increased M. Flournoy's reputation and made him a leading authority on the subject. But his first work is still one of his best productions; and this new edition, preceded by a preface of Harald Höffding, is a faithful reproduction of the first.

As a foundation of the science of psychology, the author proposes the well-known law of parallelism between the mental states and the bodily conditions. Inspired by the same principles which the pragmatists have since made popular, he regards this law as a working principle, as a hypothesis whose function is simply to guide us in our researches. It may be held in connection with any metaphysical theory; and, if we try to investigate its essence, we will see that it is nothing but a confession of ignorance. The relations between mind and body are as mysterious to-day as they were at the dawn of human thought; and all philosophical systems intended to explain them have been a decided failure.

The author examines in a brief, but thorough, manner, the most